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Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in the
Cultural Defense
Rashmi Goel1
Fumiko Kimura walked into the ocean with her two small children. She
was fully aware of what she was doing. Distraught at discovering that her
husband of six years had been having an affair for the last three, she knew
that the only solution was to commit suicide, and to take her son Kazutaka,
four years old, and daughter Yuri, six months old, with her. She would
commit oyaku shinju2—an ancient Japanese practice of parent-child suicide.
Kimura was saved. Her children were not. In California Superior Court,
Kimura was charged with murder.3
Fumiko Kimura’s lawyer interposed the defense of temporary insanity,4
based in part on a belief that any mother who kills her children must be
insane. And yet, what Fumiko Kimura did was anything but insane. Based
on cultural imperatives, imperatives that shaped her conceptions of
mothering, Fumiko Kimura engaged in conduct that was, though illegal,
culturally permissible. Thus, the moment her attorney decided to craft a
defense that characterized her act as deranged, her legal adventure became a
clash of cultures in which her voice was submerged by her lawyer’s voice, a
voice that ultimately failed to explain her actions and failed to advocate for
her future.
Because of the cultural implications for the client as a whole, lawyers
faced with this unfamiliar territory of complex cultural difference must
choose defense strategies carefully. In this case, Kimura’s lawyer, Gerald
Klausner,5 chose to argue temporary insanity. Judged narrowly, this
strategy was successful: the charge was eventually reduced to voluntary
manslaughter for which Fumiko Kimura received a one-year sentence (time
served awaiting trial) and five years of probation with mandatory
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psychological counseling.6 Yet, Klausner’s approach was flawed because it
did not take into account Fumiko Kimura’s own cultural background as a
basis for her decision to commit oyaku shinju. Fumiko Kimura hardly met
the standard for temporary insanity,7 but by proferring this defense,
Klausner implied too much about Japanese culture.8 If Kimura’s actions
constituted temporary insanity, despite their being in keeping with Japanese
culture, wouldn’t that make Japanese culture similarly insane? Judged
broadly, such a defense is not only offensive, but harmful.
What does it say when a lawyer asserts in court, and even convinces the
judge to hold, that a widely held cultural belief9 is in fact insane? Do the
ramifications of such a strategy matter? Such creative lawyering raises a
host of ethical problems, not only because of its implications for the
community but, foremost, because of its implications for the client. In the
pages that follow, I endeavor to draw attention to this thorny ethical issue:
in the context of the cultural defense, how should an attorney meet the
strenuous obligation of mounting a zealous defense without compromising
the cultural integrity of the client?10
The solution, I suggest, lies in our characterization of the client’s
interests. Both zealous advocacy and justice would be better served by a
client-centered approach that perceives the client beyond her legal interests.
In fact, I believe that the lawyer should seek the best overall outcome for
the client, and in so doing, must understand and advocate for the whole
client, ensuring that the client’s voice is infused into the proceedings by
taking into account the client’s cultural background and personal values.
This essay is divided into four sections. In part one, I provide greater
detail about Fumiko Kimura and her motivations for committing oyaku
shinju. In parts two and three, I will touch on the duties of a lawyer to
zealously advocate for the legal interests of the client and explore the
dangers of ignoring culture in a client’s defense. Finally, I will draw on
legal ethics literature to suggest a way in which the whole client, including
her legal and cultural interests, could be better served.
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PART I: FUMIKO KIMURA—THE WHOLE CLIENT
Fumiko Kimura was one of six children from a broken home. Despite
her strong interest in piano, she was unable to gain entrance into Japan’s
National Music University and, as a result, chose to leave Japan and pursue
other interests in California. Though she enrolled in a community college,
she never graduated. She married a Japanese American but divorced after
eight years. She later met Itsuroku Kimura whom she married in 1979.11
At the time of her oyaku shinju attempt, she had been living in the United
States for fourteen years; however, she remained Japanese in her thinking
and lifestyle, isolated from American culture.12 Fumiko Kimura did not
drive, knew nothing of her husband’s business, and had no hobbies or close
friends outside the family.13 Ten days prior to her suicide attempt, Fumiko
Kimura discovered that her husband had been having an extramarital affair
for three years.14 Fumiko Kimura decided to end her life, and to take her
children with her.
Fumiko Kimura did not perceive her actions as wrong. Based on her own
cultural ideals and values, she was doing the right thing. In Fumiko
Kimura’s case, conceptions of shame, suicide, and mothering coincided in a
way that was uniquely Japanese and rendered her choice unavoidable.
A. Japanese Conceptions of Shame
Upon discovering her husband’s affair, Fumiko Kimura was deeply
ashamed and dejected. Rather than marking him as a philanderer or
unscrupulous adulterer, Itsuroku Kimura’s transgression indicated to
Fumiko Kimura that she was a bad wife who was unable to please her
husband despite all her efforts. This shame was perhaps even more
pronounced because the affair had actually been revealed one year earlier, at
which time Itsuroku Kimura had promised to end it.15 In fact, he did not, so
Fumiko Kimura was twice betrayed. Her efforts to be the perfect wife and
mother had fallen short; otherwise her husband would not have returned to
his mistress after promising to end the affair. Fumiko Kimura considered
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other possibilities such as returning to Japan,16 but none could save her or
her children from the stigma of a failed marriage.17
According to sociologist Dr. Yuko Kawanishi, children in Japan do suffer
ill effects from being fatherless or being from a one-parent family. In
Japan, there are few orphanages and foster care facilities, and a mother
would not want to leave her children at the mercy of a stepmother.18
Sometimes these children are denied jobs even as adults because of the
shameful family background.19
B. Japanese Conceptions of Suicide
Fumiko Kimura’s decision to end her life was not necessarily a mark of
mental illness. While suicide in the United States is generally considered a
mark of mental instability, it is clear that the view of suicide in Japan is
markedly different. In Japan, the symbolic sacrifice of human life simply
takes on many more meanings than in the United States, where it is viewed
as merely a sad tragedy or a mental illness. Though I hesitate to argue that
suicide is a commonly accepted or an honored practice in Japanese culture,
the actions of Fumiko Kimura, her husband, and the mistress, are at least
illustrative of a unique readiness to see suicide as a solution in difficult
situations. Itsuroku Kimura’s mistress, Kazue Tanahashi,20 personally
revealed the ongoing affair to Fumiko Kimura by phone and even showed
her love letters. Tanahashi later sent a letter to Fumiko Kimura on January
27, 1985, “offering to kill herself if that would help ease the family’s
pain.”21 Another report stated that Tanahashi was thinking of killing
Itsuroku Kimura and herself.22 According to Alfred Kriman, police reports
revealed that, “Mrs. Kimura [then] made some attempts to apologize to the
mistress.23 She had a boy deliver a note containing an apology and offering
to ‘sacrifice her own life if the problem could be settled.’”24 When Itsuroku
Kimura learned of his son’s death at the hospital, he threatened to take his
own life.25 At some point, every member of this love triangle offered to
commit suicide. According to Dr. Kawanishi, suicide in Japanese culture
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may be more readily perceived as an option (even though an option of last
resort) because “there seem to be greater ‘vocabularies of motives’” for
suicide. One can commit suicide not only for self-destruction or self-hatred,
but also from such motivations as punishing others, saving face, expressing
apology, or loving another with such strong attachment that taking that
person’s life with one’s own is necessary.”26
C. Japanese Conceptions of Mothering
For Fumiko Kimura, one of her greatest motivators was her role as a
mother. She was completely devoted to her children. She had all her
furniture removed from her living room, including her piano, to avoid
possible injury to the children should they fall. She even kept a schedule
designating specific times to play with her son.27 Such attention is
consistent with the Japanese views of motherhood as a transcendent state of
being that surpasses all other life roles.28 Studies have found that mothers
in Japan are particularly role bound in this regard, for instance, they
generally mark stages in their own lives by their children’s ages.29 Fumiko
Kimura knew that leaving her children behind,30 motherless in a cruel
world, would be a greater wrong than taking them with her. She could not
abandon them in the world to remain without her care and protection.31 She
was particularly concerned that her children would suffer the stigma of her
failure as a wife and mother and would be cruelly treated. Nor could she
live with them and give them the care and protection they needed; she had
nowhere to go and no means of support. Fumiko Kimura’s failed marriage
almost necessitated her suicide, and her great motherly love for her children
necessitated that she take them with her. An examination of this belief is
instructive:
In Japan, the mother-child bond and the mother’s dedication to the
child are very important. Why then, is infanticide committed by
the mother relatively common in Japan? Paradoxically, it is this
very bond between mother and child that causes oyako shinju.
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According to Japanese logic, the suicidal mother cannot bear to
leave the child to survive alone; she would rather kill the child
because she believes that nobody else in the world would take care
of the child better than she, and that the child would be better off
dying with her.32
Indeed, to commit suicide alone, leaving her children behind, would not
make Fumiko Kimura more caring but would confirm her failure as a
mother and brand her with demonlike behavior.33 Such abandonment
would be beyond cruel and would stain the children with the shame of an
adulterous father and a suicidal mother, who did not love her children
enough to take them with her.34
D. Interdependence
When we view these three factors together, we find that the essential
difference in Japanese societal mores is the deeply embedded notion of
interdependence. Unlike the high degree of individualism prized and
promoted in American culture, Japanese culture values relations and
interdependence, where the self is submerged in the network of roles a
person has in relation to others.35 Therefore, for a mother, the deprivation
of a child’s life is an extended extinguishing of one’s own life, not a
violation of the child’s individual rights. The child is not really an
individual, but part of the mother. The child could not exist without the
mother and is entirely dependent on the mother.36 The mother is similarly
dependent on the existence of the child.
Such a belief system is entirely at odds with our own notions of
independence and autonomy and, in particular, the notions of individualism
and personal culpability that pervade our legal system. Kimura was not
charged with the crime of attempted suicide, but with the murder of her two
children. Under California criminal law, Kimura must be culpable precisely
because she failed to recognize her children as separate entities, deserving
of life without her, no matter how miserable. Yet, for Fumiko Kimura to
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acknowledge her children as separate entities would brand her a bad mother.
While Kimura’s marital situation might have pushed her toward suicide
regardless of her culture, it was her culture that propelled her to take the
lives of her children. Fumiko Kimura was damned either way: by the
California penal system for not recognizing her offspring as separate, or by
her own culture for treating them as separate.
In choosing to ignore or discard the cultural factors involved in Kimura’s
act, Klausner (her attorney), the prosecutor, and the legal system itself,
failed to acknowledge not only her background but also her motivations.
Instead, she was measured by a narrow Western conception of sanity, one
she could not possibly meet because her own cultural views on suicide and
mothering stood in stark contrast.

PART II: THE LAWYER AS ZEALOUS ADVOCATE
Given this difficult and complex circumstance, what were Klausner’s
obligations to Fumiko Kimura? Did he make the right choice? The
Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct refers to “A Lawyer’s
Responsibilities” and states, “A lawyer is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice.” 37 Later, the same preamble states:
A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer
of the legal system, and a public citizen are usually harmonious.
Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be
a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time
assume that justice is being done.38
Practitioners and academics alike have long ascribed great importance to
the lawyer’s role of zealous advocate. They suggest that we recall the
famous words of Lord Brougham (a nineteenth century lord chancellor of
England and brilliant orator):
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

449

450 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other
persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty;
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must
go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.39
Though spoken over one hundred years ago, Lord Brougham’s advice
remains the dominant approach in understanding the ethics of lawyering.
Generally, any limitations on zealous advocacy are articulated as an
aspect of the other roles lawyers are required to play. Legal authors have
long wrestled with the question of how to balance the roles of zealous
advocate and officer of the court charged with the pursuit of justice.40
While all agree there is some tension between these roles, most see the
criminal trial as the one indisputable arena where the lawyer’s obligation
runs to the client and not to the world at large. The Model Rules and their
most recent revisions seem to echo this view.41 Even as an officer of the
court in the criminal context, the defense lawyer’s primary duty is to see
that the client receives a zealous defense, because truly zealous advocacy is
the client’s only hope against the unyielding arm of the state. Within the
boundaries of the law, we say that the lawyer should do everything within
his or her power to achieve the best possible legal outcome for the client.
Much has been written about the parameters of such a pursuit, and I do
not wish to reexamine it all here. My concern lies with this very narrow
conception of the client and her interests. Why should our understanding of
the client be limited to her legal interests and not to her other interests as
well?42 Modern-day academics have vigorously continued this debate.43 I
suggest that the best way to achieve the balance between zealous advocacy
and the pursuit of justice is to expand our notions of the client’s interests to
encompass the client’s non-legal interests and her future outside of the
courtroom. Such a change is more likely to include a pursuit of justice
simply because it looks beyond the legal realm.44 In fact, by restricting the
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understanding of the client to legal interests alone, we subject the client to a
type of legal straightjacket and bind ourselves to a more limiting vision of
the law’s power. Opening ourselves to the client’s other interests,
especially cultural interests, frees us from such oppression and allows us to
better serve the client as a whole, while still balancing zealous advocacy
and the pursuit of justice.

PART III: THE DANGERS OF IGNORING CULTURAL EVIDENCE
Admittedly, Kimura’s lawyer was faced with a very difficult choice. He
chose to argue that Kimura was not in her right senses, and that despair and
anxiety led her to snap and become desperate and irrational. He could have
argued that Kimura was acting rationally, fully aware of her actions and
their consequences. Such an approach would likely have resulted in a guilty
verdict for first degree murder, with only the tragedy of the circumstances
to mitigate her sentence. Lauren Weis, the prosecutor assigned to the case,
understood this point perfectly when she responded in a TV interview, “[I]f
Mrs. Kimura did in fact kill her children because of her cultural
background, it would seem to show that she intended to kill them, and that
she was competent, and that she was thinking of doing that, that she was
deliberately doing that.”45
I am not suggesting the attorneys in this matter were culturally ignorant.
In fact, the following newspaper accounts demonstrate that the attorneys
were acutely aware of the cultural evidence, which they decided not to
present:
Kimura’s attorney, Gerald Klausner, is not inclined to stress
the cultural angle, although he acknowledged that others
believe it is her best defense.46
‘They think that [the fact that] she’s Japanese should be
defense enough, that the defense should rest more on her
culture,’ [Klausner] said. Klausner hasn’t decided whether or
not to use insanity as a possible defense, although he describes
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his client as ‘mentally deranged at the time—with a Japanese
flavor, a Japanese fashion.’47
The case, says Deputy District Attorney Lauren L. Weis, ‘is
very, very difficult,’ but she rejects the use of Japanese law. . .
. ‘You’re treading on such shaky ground when you decide
something based on a cultural thing because our society is
made up of so many different cultures. It is very hard to draw
the line somewhere, but they are living in our country and
people have to abide by our laws or else you have anarchy.’48
Was it proper for the defense counsel to paint Fumiko Kimura as
temporarily insane, when she was merely acting consistent with her own
cultural values? I do not wish to understate the predicament facing the
attorneys in this case, and, in fact, I do not dispute the correctness of the
final legal outcome. Credit for time served and five years of probation with
mandatory psychiatric counseling was a merciful sentence and one very
similar to any she might have received in Japan.49 The legal constraints at
the time forced defense attorney Klausner to forego the introduction of
cultural evidence. His choice, however, not to discuss the cultural
motivations in the courtroom, had two undesirable effects: (1) he relegated
any such discussion to the media frenzy surrounding the event; and (2) he
deprived Kimura of the opportunity to be heard as a whole person and to
preserve her cultural dignity.50
A. The Danger of Leaving Culture to the Media
By relegating the discussion of cultural factors to newspapers, magazines,
and television, the media became the vehicle charged with accurate
representation of Japanese culture and the complex facts surrounding
Fumiko Kimura’s oyaku shinju attempt. The views and values of the
Japanese community were heard only in snippets and sound bites. The idea
that morality might be culturally relative, as opposed to universal, was
removed from the purview of the court, arguably the best place for such a
conversation to occur.51 Instead, placing this conversation in the forum of
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public opinion leaves the conversation vulnerable to the use of stereotypes
and untruth.
The media simply did not allow for full and nuanced discussions about
Kimura and why she chose to do what she did. This is evidenced in the
numerous and varied newspaper accounts of Fumiko Kimura’s life and her
oyaku shinju attempt. The newspaper reports seldom included a discussion
of the relevant law or what the punishment, if any, might be in Japan.52
Very few included any discussion of Fumiko Kimura’s level of acclimation
to American society.53 Stereotypes about Japanese submissiveness were
allowed to buoy entire stories. Several papers covering the events gave
variant reports on Kimura’s ability to speak English and her status in the
country.54 Given the short coverage allotted to cultural background in
television and newspaper reports, it is not possible to explore in any depth
the complexities of culture. Reporters are therefore forced to rely on
stereotypes and the background knowledge, experiences, and
misinformation that their audience possesses.
One is moved to ask what effect relegating cultural issues to the media
reporting has on relations between cultures, especially if our conception of
justice includes greater intercultural understanding.55 In leaving this
important discussion to the media, do we further or frustrate multicultural
harmony? I would argue that, like racial and gender stereotypes perpetuated
in the media, the misapprehension of cultural matters in the media causes
harm, especially in a heterogeneous society such as ours. Cultural
stereotyping is particularly pernicious and difficult to eradicate. Unlike
with racial and gender stereotypes, most people lack a frame of reference
with cultural stereotypes. In race and gender cases, the public has some
personal experience to draw on—positive or negative. People may hold
negative stereotypes about women (“all women are bad drivers”) or about
other races (“African American males are dangerous”), but there are
tremendous daily opportunities to disavow such beliefs. For instance, one
may have a mild mannered African American colleague, or may know a
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woman who is an excellent driver. Even if some who hold such stereotypes
about women and African Americans find only deeper proof in the
exception, such beliefs are at least open to debate through the individual’s
own personal contact and experience with members of the other group. In
other words, there is a greater likelihood that people will see through race
and gender stereotypes based on their own personal experiences.
In contrast, stereotypes in the cultural context are unlikely to be
counteracted in this fashion since people are much less likely to know, and
to know about, individuals of differing cultural backgrounds. Even if
members of the public do have personal experience with individuals who
share the defendant’s culture, they are unlikely to know significant facts
about the culture itself because such matters are usually considered very
personal. For instance, a Muslim coworker is unlikely to talk about the
expectations he has of his wife, yet there is a pervasive stereotype that
Muslim men are controlling and abusive toward their wives, daughters, and
sisters. Similarly, there are strong stereotypes that Latino males are macho
and hot tempered and that Asian women are submissive. As such, I suggest
that the cultural stereotypes are more harmful than the racial or sexist
stereotypes because the average person has little personal experience to
counteract the reports given in newspapers and magazines.
In addition, cultural stereotypes are more dangerous because they fill the
void of ignorance with a monolithic representation of something incredibly
complex. The history of the cultural stereotype is bound up with
colonialism, evangelism, world history, and modern politics. Culture,
unlike race and gender, is an inherently dynamic characteristic, changing
over time and place with historic events and shifts in population. Like
stereotypes about race, cultural stereotypes take on a particular importance
as they provide shorthand characterizations about other groups. Instead of
promoting the search for truth, such portrayals capitalize on ignorance and
fear. Furthermore, without some personal experience of the relevant
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culture, an individual is unlikely to voice or hear objections to the use of
cultural stereotypes.
Despite the large Japanese population in southern California, most people
were unaware of oyaku shinju before the case of Fumiko Kimura. The
miniseries Shogun, which aired in 1980 to captivated audiences, delivered a
mesmerizing portrait of feudal Japan, and was the greatest cultural
education about Japan around this time.56 Although popular, the Shogun
miniseries did little, if anything, to educate Americans about the Japan of
the 1980s or the cultural imperatives that motivated Kimura.
The Japanese community itself felt that the justice system should know
its side of the story and understand Fumiko Kimura as a whole person with
a cultural background that profoundly influenced her actions. The Japanese
American community responded to Fumiko Kimura’s case with petitions in
an attempt to educate the judge and the public. Members of the community
rallied and circulated petitions explaining the history of oyaku shinju and
asking that Kimura be judged by Japanese standards. The petitions
garnered more than 25,000 signatures from people in the United States,
Canada, Germany, and beyond.57 The community did not want Japanese
culture, including this small part of Japanese culture, to be portrayed as
deranged, even if it was the best legal defense available at the time.
Despite the remarkable efforts of the Japanese community worldwide, I
firmly assert that by ignoring culture, the legal approach taken in this case
did a tremendous disservice to both the Japanese American community and
the community at large. It relegated the discussion of culture to an
environment where stereotypes could flourish and then left the Japanese
American community to protect itself from the resulting harm.
B. The Fall Out of Depriving Fumiko Kimura of Her Cultural Voice
In this case, it is not even necessary to contextualize the impact in terms
of the community, because Klausner’s choice to assert a temporary insanity
defense also had an effect on Fumiko Kimura herself. In suppressing
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Fumiko Kimura’s cultural story, Klausner deprived her of a dignified
narrative. Removing her story from its cultural moorings rendered Fumiko
Kimura malevolent or undeniably unbalanced in the eyes of American
culture. Within an American cultural framework, her behavior cannot be
understood as rational or based on a healthy desire to prove her love to her
children. Such an explanation only makes sense in the context of Japanese
culture.
Her conceptions of shame, suicide, mothering, and
interdependence, which motivated her actions, were left outside the
courtroom door, and she remained silenced by a legal system that failed to
take into account her unique circumstances.
Aware that the client will return to society and to her community, we
must ask what effect any particular legal strategy has on her relationship
with her community. If her lawyer portrays her culture as crazy in the
courtroom, will her community ostracize her? If she is presented as a
victim of an oppressive and unyielding set of traditions, will her own
community judge her a traitor? Having assented to the role of a deranged
person, will she ever be able to reclaim the title of deeply devoted mother
that her community once bestowed on her? By placing her actions outside
their cultural frame, Klausner effectively removed Fumiko Kimura from her
place in her community and framed her as legally insane within the
mainstream community. As a result, she became an outsider in both
communities, losing her status as a mother and finding her only source of
support to be the husband who betrayed her. More attention to Fumiko
Kimura’s non-legal interests could have rendered a more palatable solution.

PART IV: THE MIDDLE ROAD—A CULTURAL DEFENSE
I have stated that Klausner had two choices: 1) he could have argued that
Fumiko Kimura was acting in her right senses, which would have subjected
her to a probable guilty verdict; or 2) he could have argued that she was not
in her right senses, but legally insane. He chose the second. But there was
also a third option—a middle-of-the-road solution.58 Klausner could have

THEORY MEETS PRAXIS

Can I Call Kimura Crazy?

argued that what Kimura did was not wrong and that our own notions of
suicide, mothering, and interdependence should be reexamined. At a
minimum, such an approach would have required a detailed and nuanced
understanding of who Fumiko Kimura was and why she decided to commit
oyaku shinju. In other words, it would have required introducing cultural
evidence.
Since 1985 when Kimura was first charged, a number of cases have
offered cultural evidence to provide context and background for the
defendant’s actions.59 In general, there are two approaches to the cultural
defense. The first approach proffers evidence to demonstrate that, given the
defendant’s cultural background, the defendant perceived the situation such
that no crime was really committed. We might call this a cognitive cultural
defense case. For example, due to his cultural background, one particular
defendant believed that a woman was actually consenting to intercourse
when in fact she was not.60 Such defenses allow the defendant to utilize
standard criminal defenses such as mistake of fact. In the second approach,
evidence is introduced to prove that the defendant’s behavior, though
reprehensible and criminal in the United States, is nonetheless legally or
culturally permitted, or even required, in the defendant’s home country. We
might call this a normative cultural defense case. For example, an Iranian
father may argue that in his culture it is appropriate to arrange and complete
his young daughter’s marriage at age twelve to a much older and
established man. A host of questions arise from these two approaches. It is
not my aim to address them here, only to say that in both scenarios we are
forced to examine the whole client. In the second category of cases
especially, we are forced to confront our own community values and
notions of justice.
The tension between community justice lawyering and zealous advocacy
has spawned a few solutions that might prove useful in the cultural context.
Anthony Alfieri writes prolifically in the area of lawyering and racial
stereotypes.61 Alfieri generally prefers a strong version of “race conscious
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lawyering”62 that requires the lawyer to refrain from using “racialized”
narratives63 when the lawyer knows they might negatively affect the
community. Alfieri argues that lawyers have a responsibility to prevent
causing racial disharmony in the community. Such an approach clearly
weighs heavily on the side of community justice rather than zealous
advocacy.
Alfieri concedes that a weaker prescription might be a suitable
compromise, for example, giving the client the power to make such
decisions.64 He recommends that the lawyer have a comprehensive
conversation65 with the client to explain the possible community
repercussions, while allowing the client to make the decision. According to
Alfieri, the client is the best person to judge how any particular strategy
involving racial evidence would affect her, her family, and her community.
Alfieri’s approach recognizes that the client may have interests beyond the
legal outcome of the trial, including racial harmony in her community. It
also recognizes that the client is ultimately in the best position to decide
whether or not to forgo those interests in favor of her legal and liberty
interests.
While I find Alfieri’s stronger position attractive in its idealism, his
weaker prescription holds the most promise for cases involving cultural
evidence. Such an approach would recognize the whole client beyond her
legal interests and incorporate her personal and cultural interests as well.
Alfieri’s alternative prescription requires an attorney to have a
comprehensive conversation with the client and then allow the client to
make the ultimate decision regarding cultural evidence. In adopting this
approach, an attorney must be sure to examine how such a conversation
with the client will be carried out. Which implications should the attorney
highlight? Should the attorney point out only the likelihood of success on
the merits and the fact that the strategy may be controversial? Should the
attorney ask the client for her views and feelings about having her cultural
beliefs portrayed as insane? The comprehensive conversation should not

THEORY MEETS PRAXIS

Can I Call Kimura Crazy?

emphasize only the client’s legal interests but should also include an
acknowledgement of the limitations of the criminal law and also the battle
between the value systems inherent in the legal strategy.
Should the attorney tell the client that a positive legal result from a
temporary insanity plea will most likely result in psychiatric counseling that
might challenge her core belief system? Should the attorney explain that in
agreeing to this strategy, the client may in fact be acquiescing to Western
notions of personal autonomy and independence (even for six-month-old
infants) and shunning the notions of interdependence inherent in the cultural
practice of oyaku shinju? This kind of approach would allow the client to
assess the possible ramifications vis-à-vis her own culture and examine
whether she is ready to either abandon them or at least pretend to abandon
them. Should the attorney tell the client that her community might shun her
if she chooses such a course or allow her to raise such a concern herself?
Unfortunately, in Fumiko Kimura’s case, it does not appear that this
conversation took place.66 Devoted to the best possible legal outcome for
his client, Klausner could not make room for Kimura’s cultural voice.
Understanding the client beyond her legal interests would necessitate such a
conversation, however, and allow an opportunity to incorporate the client’s
voice into the adopted legal strategy.

PART V: CONCLUSION
In 1985, it was unlikely that a cultural defense would have worked; both
attorneys were hamstrung by a system that acknowledged only legal
wrongs67 and left very little room for the cultural factors that affected
Fumiko Kimura. Since that time the law has changed. Overall, the criminal
justice system has moved further toward an individual standard and away
from the reasonable person standard that peppered criminal law and
precluded Fumiko Kimura from using cultural evidence.68 Many attorneys
who have since used cultural evidence insist that the time is ripe to
thoroughly consider the effect of cultural background on individual
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culpability. The last twenty years have spawned a number of cultural
defense cases69 and many judges now admit and consider cultural evidence.
While not every lawyer is willing to wear the mantle of trailblazer, the law
is not formed by precedent alone; the law’s power is its ability and
willingness to respond to societal needs. For example, battered-woman’s
syndrome was allowed as a defense only by forcing open the doors of
jurisprudence to encompass a battered woman’s experience.
Today’s lawyers are at least obligated to pay heed to the path forged by
others. Legal academics urge us to further consider the possibility of law by
examining its effect and potential for those oppressed through racial,
gender, and cultural dynamics. The lawyer’s responsibility is to heed this
call, recognize the client beyond her legal interests, and, in the pursuit of
justice, advocate for the whole client.
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